



Upjohn Institute Press 
 
 
Employment and Benefits 







Walter Y. Oi 









Chapter 4 (pp. 103-128) in: 
Disability, Work and Cash Benefits 
Jerry L. Mashaw, Virginia Reno, Richard V. Burkhauser, and 
Monroe Berkowitz, eds. 




Copyright ©1996. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. All rights reserved. 
Employment and Benefits for People 
with Diverse Disabilities
Walter Y. Oi 
University of Rochester
The Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA or, simply, the Act) 
became the law of the land over four years ago and was supposed to 
improve the lives of 43 million disabled individuals. It has not pro 
duced the anticipated growth in employment. There are proportionally 
more persons getting disability benefits from the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) today. Employers are reluctant to talk about the 
ADA, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
has reported a sharp increase in the number of lawsuits filed by dis 
gruntled workers charging that employers are violating the law. The 
problem can be traced to the fact that the ADA embraced a civil rights 
approach to achieve its employment goal. As stated by Nancy Lee 
Jones:
Seldom do race, sex, or national origin present any obstacle to an 
individual in performing a job or participating in a program. Dis 
abilities by their very nature, however, may make certain jobs or 
types of participation impossible (Jones 1991).
Insufficient attention was paid to the nature of a disabling condition 
and to the wide diversity of such conditions. This paper tries to develop 
a theory of the labor market for people with disabilities, recognizing 
the great range and instability of disabling conditions. Work is not the 
preferred path to a higher level of satisfaction for all disabled persons. 
The employment goal of the ADA should be coordinated with a larger 
policy portfolio providing training, income transfers, and medical care 
to people with disabilities. Further, these policies should recognize the 
wide differences across individuals identified by the age at onset and 
the impairment. Not everyone ought to get the same monthly benefit or 
access to training and job placement services. It is surely true that if 
you want to treat people fairly, you have to treat them differently.
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A Person with a Disability
The ADA implies that there is a minority distinguishable from a 
majority of nondisabled persons. A large body of literature deals with 
the concept of disability and its measurement. Johnson and Lambrinos 
(1985) turned to the definitions set forth by the World Health Organiza 
tion to distinguish among three terms.
Impairment is a psychological, anatomical, or mental loss or some 
other abnormality. Disability is a restriction on or lack (resulting 
from an impairment) of an ability to perform an activity in the 
manner or within the range considered normal. Handicap is a dis 
advantage resulting from an impairment or disability (p. 265, 
emphasis added).
Policy makers seem to prefer a definition based on functional limita 
tions. A problem arises because the definition for a substantial limita 
tion, "an inability to perform an activity in the manner or within the 
range considered normal," depends on the activity and the environ 
ment. An inability to reach or to lift may be a seriously disabling con 
dition for a lobster fisherman but only a nuisance for a preacher. The 
latter might not even report such a limitation in a survey. The language 
of the Act sets forth the following definition.
Disability means with respect to an individual (1) a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the 
major life activities of such individual, (2) a record of such an 
impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.
Major life activities means functions such as caring for oneself, 
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, 
breathing, learning, and working. There is no requirement for a 
medical certification of the impairment, a record or being 
regarded as having such an impairment is sufficient. The interpre 
tative guidance to the Act argues that the ADA is intended to 
establish a process wherein disability will be determined on an 
individual basis.
This case by case approach is essential if qualified individuals of 
varying abilities are to receive equal opportunities to compete for 
an infinitely diverse range of jobs. For this reason, neither the 
ADA nor this regulation can supply the correct answer in advance
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for each employment decision concerning an individual with a 
disability (emphasis added).
According to the EEOC regulations, disability would seem to be a 
highly subjective state that defies quantification.
The surveys that have been undertaken mainly rely on self-reporting 
of functional limitations, activities of daily living (ADL), and impair 
ments or chronic disabling conditions. They yield varying estimates of 
the overall prevalence of disability but show agreement on differences 
in the relative incidence rates due to age, race, gender, and education. 
Based on data from the March 1988 Current Population Survey (CPS), 
Bennefield and McNeil (1989) estimated that there were 13.4 million 
working-age Americans (8.6 percent) with a work disability. The pro 
portion with a reported disability is higher in surveys conducted to 
ascertain health and program participation status; 11.5 percent of 
working-age adults were disabled in the 1984 Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP) and 11.3 percent in the 1983 National 
Health Interview Survey (HIS). LaPlante (1988) reported that orthope 
dic impairments were the leading factor, accounting for 29 percent of 
the 17.4 million adults with a work disability in 1983-1985. 1 The ele 
ments of the health capital vector A deteriorate at different rates, with 
sharply rising incidence rates for cancers, digestive, and circulatory 
impairments. Only 11.4 percent of work limitations reported by adults 
18-44 years old were caused by these three conditions, but this figure 
climbs to 32 percent for the group aged 45-69. The shorter life expect 
ancy of mentally retarded persons is responsible for the declining 
importance of mental conditions as a cause for work limitations.
Table 1 presents the LaPlante estimates in relation to the age-spe 
cific U.S. populations. Some 5.8 percent of Americans 18-44 years old 
reported a work limitation, and this incidence rate rose to 21 percent 
for the group aged 45-69, a 3.6-fold increase in the work disability rate. 
The work disability rate due to orthopedic impairments rose from 2.4 
to 4.8 percent. The functional limitations associated with ulcers are dif 
ferent from those due to hypertension or from partial paralysis of the 
lower extremities, and these differences will surely affect the kinds and 
costs of reasonable workplace accommodations.
From an analytic viewpoint, disability ought to be described by both 
the functional limitation and by the impairment. A person's manual
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Table 1. Incidence of Work Limitations by Age and Sex
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SOURCE- Derived from data in LaPlante (1988, table 1A)
NOTE Percentages may not sum precisely to totals due to rounding
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dexterity might be constrained by an injury to a muscle or by the devel 
opment of arthritis. As Yelin (1991) points out, on a bad day, an 
arthritic individual may need more time in the morning to get started, 
but the person with the muscle injury may be permanently limited. The 
former may need a flextime work schedule for his or her accommoda 
tion, while the latter may require special equipment. Additionally, 
knowledge about both the impairment and functional proficiency con 
veys more information with respect to the length of the remaining work 
life.
Supplying Time to the Labor Market
Over two-thirds of working-age adults with a disability are out of 
the labor force or unemployed. According to Bennefield and McNeil 
(1989), only 27.8 percent of disabled men were gainfully employed in 
March 1988, as compared to 74.4 percent of nondisabled men. Dis 
abled men earned only $15,497 a year, 64 percent of the annual earn 
ings of nondisabled men. A third of the disabled respondents to the 
1983 HIS and 44 percent of disabled persons in the Louis Harris poll 
who were not employed indicated that they wanted to work. Brown 
(1989) analyzed the HIS data and found that persons with three or 
more functional limitations expressed a far stronger preference for 
work than persons with one or two limitations.
The familiar model of Sir Lionel Robbins (1930) serves as a useful 
point of departure. The utility maximizing supply of work hours H (the 
difference between a time endowment T and the demand for leisure 
hours L;H= T-L), is determined by tastes (for a consumption good and 
leisure) and a budget constraint describing the opportunity set. The 
equilibrium depicted in figure 1 satisfies two equations, a budget con 
straint and an equality of the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) to the 
wage rate:
X + wL = F = wT+ 7 and MRS = UL/Ux =
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where w is the hourly wage, Y is nonwage income, and F is full 
income. (X stands for consumption, UL and Ux denote the marginal 
utilities of leisure and consumption.)
Figure 1
The onset of a disabling condition can displace the equilibrium in 
three ways. First, poor health is likely to affect tastes by raising the 
marginal value of leisure time, meaning a larger MRS. The adjustment 
involves an increase in the demand for leisure and reduces the supply 
of work hours, possibly to zero if the person is pushed to the corner at 
point Y in figure 1. Second, the disability might reduce the person's 
productivity, implying a decrease in the hourly wage w which he or she 
can command in the market. The disability pushes the individual to a 
lower indifference curve, but its impact on the supply of labor time H 
depends on the strengths of the opposing substitution and income 
effects. Third, disability steals time. We all get the same endowment of 
calendar time, r* = 168 hours a week, but the time required for mainte 
nance of the human agent varies. Stafford and Duncan (1980) discov 
ered that individuals with lower wages devoted more time to sleep. A 
rigorous model of the demand for sleep was developed by Biddle and 
Hamermesh (1990). Time for medical and personal care ought also to 
be included in maintenance time Tm. The pertinent discretionary time 
endowment that can be allocated to work and leisure, T = T*-Tm, is 
surely a function of the individual's stock of health capital. 2 A dis-
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abling condition can be expected to shove T to the left, which unam 
biguously reduces work hours H (= T-L). Some disabled persons may 
choose to accept part-time employment, while others may opt to with 
draw from the labor force. That disabled individuals supply less time to 
the labor market can be explained in the context of the Robbins model, 
where disability can affect tastes, wages, or discretionary time endow 
ments.
Equal Employment Opportunities
The hearings before the House and Senate committees preceding the 
passage of the ADA supported the following findings:
• Historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals 
with disabilities and such discrimination continues to be a serious 
and pervasive social problem.
•Discrimination persists in such areas as employment, housing, 
public accommodations, education, transportation.
• Unlike individuals who face discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, or sex, people with disabilities have often had no legal 
recourse to redress such discrimination.
•Census data have documented that people with disabilities as a 
group occupy an inferior status in our society and are severely dis- 
advantaged.
• The nation's goals are to assure equality of opportunity, full partic 
ipation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency.
These findings were mainly supported by testimony involving cases in 
which individuals were denied access to places, housing, and, most 
importantly, to jobs because of their disabilities. In a 1972 survey, the 
average hourly wages of handicapped workers were some 44.5 percent 
below the average for nondisabled men. Johnson and Lambrinos 
(1985) estimated that 15.2 percentage points of this differential could 
be attributed to discrimination in the labor market. 3 The ADA was
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enacted to guarantee equal employment opportunities, but to do so, it 
had to define what constituted labor market discrimination.
In section 1630.g of the Regulations, the ADA adopts a three- 
pronged approach. First, a person is said to have a disability if he or 
she has "an impairment that substantially limits one or more of the 
major life activities of such individuals." Whether the substantial activ 
ity limitation or limitations affect the capacity to do the work is to be 
determined by the concept of "a qualified person with a disability." 
This qualification is to be determined in two steps: (a) whether the 
individual has the requisite skills, experience, education, licenses, etc., 
and (b) whether the individual can perform the essential functions with 
or without accommodations, the two remaining prongs in the three- 
pronged approach. The EEOC has apparently embraced a fuzzy crite 
rion, namely, a threshold hiring standard that will be determined by the 
essential functions of the job. 4 If a job is narrowly described (e.g., 
proofreading aloud, lifting, etc.), it will be easier to ascertain if a per 
son is qualified. The "interpretative guidance" contained one example 
in which an applicant might be asked for a driver's license because, in 
some exceptional instances, the person might be asked to drive. If driv 
ing is a marginal function of the main job, and if there are enough other 
employees with licenses among whom to distribute any driving chores, 
the employer could not deny employment because the applicant had no 
driver's license. The set of essential functions associated with a job 
will be smaller, the larger the size of the employer's workforce. If a 
clerk at a garden store is occasionally required to lift 100-pound bags 
of fertilizer, lifting would be essential in that position for a store hiring 
only two clerks but not for a store with twelve clerks. If a requirement 
is defined by a work load (e.g., typing 75 words a minute or standing 
for eight hours), the employer must demonstrate that the standard was 
not set to exclude a disabled person.
The phrase "with or without accommodations" is crucial in the pro 
cess of determining who is "a qualified person with a disability." An 
employer will voluntarily invest in training, superior equipment, and a 
more pleasant workplace if such investments raise labor productivity 
by more than the cost. The argument in Decker (1964) and Oi (1962) is 
that, if training increases productivity in all employment, its costs will 
be borne by the worker who receives a lower wage during the training 
period. If, however, the increased productivity is firm-specific, Hash-
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imoto and Yu (1980) have shown that it is optimal to share the costs. 
According to the EEOC regulations,
In general, an accommodation is any change in the work environ 
ment or the way things are customarily done that enables an indi 
vidual with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities 
(a) ... in the application process, (b) . . . that permit the person to 
perform the essential functions and (c) . . . to enjoy equal benefits 
and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by employees with 
out disabilities (emphasis added).
An employer would have voluntarily made the accommodation if it 
raised the individual's productivity by more than the cost. With the pas 
sage of the ADA, the decision is no longer left to discretion but is 
instead imposed as an obligation: "[covered] Employers are required to 
make reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual unless to do so would 
impose an undue hardship" (emphasis added).
The effect on demand will depend on what is construed to be a rea 
sonable accommodation and on what penalties are placed on employ 
ers for noncompliance. 5 The undue hardship defense favors the smaller 
employer with a shallow pocket. The burden of providing jobs for the 
disabled is likely to be borne by the large employers, who both have 
the wherewithal to assume the accommodation costs and who have big 
enough workforces to reduce the number of essential functions that 
have to be performed by qualified persons with a disability.
If job restructuring and part-time and part-year work schedules are 
accepted as reasonable accommodations, the employer faces a difficult 
problem in the equitable treatment of all employees. In most firms, 
part-time employees are paid at a lower hourly rate than are full-time 
employees in the "same" job. The hourly wage discount for part-time 
work is larger in manufacturing industries, but it is still observed in 
sales, service, and clerical occupations because the part-time employee 
typically receives less "on-the-job" training, has less work experience, 
and is asked to perform fewer tasks than his/her full-time counterpart. 
The existing part-time wage discounts would thus seem to reflect a 
compensating difference reflecting the lower productivity of the part- 
time employee. If disabled persons need modified work schedules 
because of then: physical/mental impairments, should they be entitled
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to the same pay as full-time employees? The correct answer is no if we 
want to discourage nondisabled persons interested in part-time jobs 
from claiming that they are disabled to avoid the part-time wage dis 
count. In short, accommodations that affect worker productivity should 
be accompanied by compensating wage differences.
There are at least two serious problems with this civil rights 
approach to disability policy. First, it forces employers to adopt a satis- 
ficing employment policy. A qualified person with a disability who 
needs only a reasonable accommodation has as much right to a job as 
any other applicant. The employer is discouraged from searching for 
the most highly qualified individual. The efficiency loss from such a 
satisficing strategy might be small if the variance in performance 
across job applicants is small. If, however, the variance is large, as it is 
perceived to be when recruiting for a highly skilled position, an obliga 
tion to accept an applicant who meets the minimal job requirements 
could result in a significant opportunity cost to the employer.
Second, disability is not an easy state to define or to determine; the 
essential functions that have to be performed can vary depending on 
the size of the workforce and on the nature of the job. The efficacy of 
reasonable accommodations is uncertain, and the legislation and the 
enforcement agencies cannot promulgate clear-cut guidelines. The 
ADA is intended to establish a process.
The intent of the Act is to promote employment by placing an obli 
gation upon covered employers to make job offers to qualified persons 
with a disability and to provide them with reasonable accommoda 
tions. Failure to do so puts the employer in a position where he or she 
can be sued for discrimination. Enforcement of the law is likely to be 
left to civil litigation. 6
Disability: Its Duration and Impact on the Length of Life
Disabling conditions are not all alike. Severity is surely an important 
dimension, which might be measured by the capacity to perform the 
various activities of daily living or by the disadvantage that accompa 
nies such limitations. In addition to severity, a disability can be 
described by (1) the age at onset, (2) the anticipated duration of the
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condition, and (3) the impact of the condition on the expected length of 
life. Disability is rarely congenital. It can sometimes be linked to a spe 
cific event, an accident, or illness, but it is usually a by-product of 
aging. The age at onset is rarely reported, but the nature of the dis 
abling condition (the diagnostic group) serves as an imperfect proxy. 
For example, mental retardation and mental illness occur relatively 
early in life, while disabilities related to cancers and to circulatory and 
digestive impairments have a later onset.
The difficulty in identifying the target population derives from the 
fact that disability is usually a transitory state. Some 13 percent of 
1,760 white male, married household heads in 1972 reported that they 
had a work disability, but only about 5 percent said that they had a dis 
ability in each of the five consecutive years, 1968-1972. 7 At onset, 
there is uncertainty about the anticipated duration. Functional limita 
tions are unstable and fluctuate from week to week. Workers hope that 
their loss of sight or difficulty in walking is only temporary. They may 
wait to ascertain the extent of the limitation before taking the next 
step—return to work, retrain for a new job, or withdraw from the labor 
force. Time and money will be spent to see if the condition can be 
reversed. The individual's response clearly depends on whether the dis 
abling condition is perceived to be temporary or permanent.
The impact of a disability on the length of life depends on the sever 
ity and nature of the impairment. Severely disabled individuals who 
qualify for benefits under the Social Security Administration's Disabil 
ity Insurance (DI) program experience substantially higher mortality 
rates. In addition, unsuccessful applicants to the DI program (who 
were denied benefits) have exhibited death rates higher than those of 
nondisabled persons (Bound 1989). Bye and Riley (1989) followed the 
cohort of 18,782 persons who were awarded benefits and enrolled in 
the DI program in 1972. 8 The percentages of this cohort who died or 
recovered (and hence were dropped from the program) during the next 
two years were determined from SSA records. Table 2 reproduces their 
findings, classified by gender and race, age at entry into the program, 
years of education, occupation, and diagnostic group. These people 
were in poor health, as evidenced by the fact that over one-eighth, 12.8 
percent, died within two years. Only 5.3 percent recovered and were 
dropped from the SSA rolls. The two-year mortality rates were higher 
for men and blacks, rising with age at entry. 9 Education and the two-
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year mortality rate are positively correlated, but this is likely a result of 
the interaction between education and age at onset. The more-educated 
disabled persons probably became disabled after they were 50 or older.
Table 2. Two-Year Death and Recovery Rates for 1972 Entrants to the 




















































































































































































































SOURCE- Bye and Riley (1989)
The surprising finding is the wide variance in death rates by diag 
nostic group. Nearly two-thirds, 64.5 percent, of those who were dis 
abled by neoplasms (cancers) passed away within two years of 
admission to the DI program. High mortality rates were also observed 
for those with genitourinary and digestive conditions: 25 and 22.5 per 
cent died within two years. People whose disabilities were caused by
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traumatic injuries had the lowest mortality rate, 2.5 percent, followed 
by musculoskeletal impairments, at 2.7 percent. Disabled beneficiaries 
whose limitations were caused by infectious diseases and traumatic 
injuries reported the highest recovery rates, 23.2 percent and 22.1 per 
cent, respectively.
Disabling conditions are not all alike and ought to be differentiated 
by severity, age at onset, duration, and longevity. Variations in mortal 
ity and recovery rates due to age and the approximate cause of the dis 
ability indicate not only the probable returns to policies promoting 
employment but also the budgetary costs of changing the standards to 
earn entitlement to DI benefits. We are sure to learn more from the 
New Beneficiary Survey about how age and diagnosis are related to 
mortality risks and to the odds of recovery. 10
Work and Welfare
In designing policies to deal with poverty, we confront the insoluble 
problem of distinguishing between the deserving and nondeserving 
poor. Garraty (1978) noted that, in the Middle Ages, doubts arose 
about the need to supply food to beggars who looked as if they might 
be able to provide for themselves. The community was unwilling to 
assist big beggars, malingerers, and free riders. There is no bright line 
separating the disabled from the nondisabled. More importantly, the 
target population of people with disabilities is not a stable minority, 
such as one differentiated by race or gender, but changes from day to 
day. Additionally, policies have to be designed to recognize the wide 
diversity among people with disabilities.
Implicit and Explicit Wage Subsidies
Wage subsidies were introduced to reduce teenage unemployment. 
The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit program is an explicit wage subsidy 
which reduces the net labor costs for an employer who hires an individ 
ual eligible for tax credits. Vocational rehabilitation can be viewed as 
an implicit subsidy because the agency assumes the cost of counseling, 
training, and placing the client. The workers' compensation program
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also offers an implicit wage subsidy for the largest employers. A cov 
ered employee who is classified as totally disabled, temporary or per 
manent, becomes eligible for weekly benefits. Most employers with 
500 or more employees are self-insured (except in a few states), and 
the workers' compensation benefits become a direct cost.
Suppose that the person in question had been earning a weekly wage 
of W = $500 before the onset of the disability and the mandated work 
ers' compensation weekly benefit B = $200. If the disabling condition 
reduces this person's productivity so that he or she is worth retaining 
only at a weekly wage of, for example, W\ = $400, a self-insured 
employer has an incentive to retain the worker, pay him or her a wage 
equal to the pre-injury wage of W = $500, and save the outlay for 
workers' compensation benefits of B = $200. Indeed, if the worker's 
net product after the onset of the disabling condition exceeds his or her 
net wage of Wn = ( W - B) = $300, it is in the firm's best interests to 
retain the disabled worker. This implicit wage subsidy is not available 
to a small employer who is not self-insured. Casual observations sug 
gest that the implicit wage subsidy under workers' compensation is 
effective. The workforces of larger firms seem to contain a higher frac 
tion of disabled employees.
Training
At the onset of disability, a worker may be uncertain about how the 
condition will affect his or her productivity and time endowment. If the 
condition is perceived to be temporary (a short anticipated duration), 
the individual is likely to exhibit a high intertemporal elasticity of sub 
stitution, sharply cutting back on his or her labor supply until the con 
dition improves. 11 When workers are not recalled by their previous 
employers and are out of the labor force, they may be eligible for train 
ing and vocational rehabilitation. A theory of human capital predicts 
that the returns to an investment in training will be larger, the greater 
the increment to earnings due to more human capital and the longer the 
anticipated period of employment. 12 The odds that individuals will 
elect to enroll in a training program and to return to work are higher, 
the younger the age at disability onset. A shorter remaining work life 
reduces the return to training, but in addition, older workers are less 
adaptable and experience higher attrition rates in vocational rehabilita-
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tion and formal training courses. We want to believe that an individual 
is unable to find suitable work because she or he lacks the requisite 
skills that can be taught in a training program, formal or on-the-job. By 
allocating more resources to training, the problem of underemploy 
ment can allegedly be solved, but only for a subset of people with dis 
abilities.
Civil Rights and Accommodations Again
The ADA obligates an employer to offer equal opportunities to "a 
qualified person with a disability who can perform the essential func 
tions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations." This 
civil rights approach ignores the caveat voiced by Jones, that disability 
is not like race and gender. Some accommodations, such as the provi 
sion of a reader or interpreter, are expensive. Under the ADA, 
"employers are required to make reasonable accommodations ... unless 
to do so would impose an undue hardship." Disputes are certain to arise 
about what are the essential functions of a job and what is a reasonable 
accommodation. The EEOC regulations explicitly state that these mat 
ters have to be settled on a case-by-case basis because the disabling 
condition and the requirements of the job can change from day to day 
or from place to place. Litigation could be reduced by replacing the 
"undue hardship" criterion with an explicit rule that specifies a cost cap 
defining what is reasonable.
It is not surprising that many disabled persons ask for flexible, part- 
time, or part-year schedules. A disability increases both the average 
maintenance time for sleep and care as well as its variance. The 
demand for short hours and more "time off' privileges will rise in 
response to a wider dispersion in the number of physician visits or in 
the days of restricted activity. The Civil Rights Act calls for "equal pay 
for equal work." But what is equal work! The hourly rate of pay for an 
employee on a part-time or flexible schedule is usually below that for a 
full-time worker. The size of the wage discount for an irregular work 
schedule varies across industries and occupations. If a job has to be 
restructured or a work schedule shortened to accommodate a disabled 
person, is the firm obliged to pay that person the same wage as that 
paid to a full-time nondisabled employee facing different working con 
ditions? If a competitive labor market establishes compensating wage
Disability, Work and Cash Benefits 119
differences for special working arrangements, these differences should 
also apply to a regulated labor market for disabled workers.
Program Participation
A disabling condition may be so severe and/or the circumstances 
may be such that work is an infeasible or inferior option. The preferred 
path could be one in which the individual withdraws from the labor 
force and applies to the SSA for DI benefits (if the person has the nec 
essary work history) or for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). In 
deciding on which path to follow, the person has to assess the extent of 
the health loss, its duration, including the chances for recovery, and the 
application costs, which entail lengthy waiting periods and delays in 
the appeal process. The returns to becoming a DI or SSI beneficiary are 
greater, the older the age at onset and the higher the anticipated mortal 
ity rate.
The number of DI/SSI beneficiaries is growing (it is nearly 7 million 
today), and the median age of new awards is falling; these develop 
ments threaten the solvency of the trust funds. A trial work period 
(TWP) was introduced as an incentive for program participants to 
return to work; they could exceed the substantial gainful activity 
(SGA) level of earnings during the TWP and still retain their monthly 
benefits and Medicare. This incentive was enhanced in 1986 by an 
extended period of eligibility (EPE), which increased the grace period 
from 15 to 36 months. Muller (1992) analyzed the New Beneficiary 
Data System data. Only 10.2 percent of the cohort who were awarded 
DI benefits in 1981 reported doing "any work," and an even smaller 
fraction, 2.8 percent, actually left the rolls in the next ten years (see the 
SGA terminations in table 3). A younger age at entitlement and more 
years of education raise the odds that a DI beneficiary will recover and 
leave the rolls. 13 Only about 6 percent of SSI beneficiaries, who are, on 
average, younger and less educated than DI beneficiaries, reported 
doing "any work" in the decade of the 1980s. The DI and SSI program 
participants are older and have more serious life-threatening impair 
ments. They are not representative of the 13-to-18 million working-age 
adults with an employment disability, and it is not surprising that a 
majority of them elect to remain out of the workforce.
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A Wider Policy Portfolio
The employment record is dismal, as documented by the finding that 
only about 28 percent of persons with a work disability in 1988 held a 
job. In addition, research by Haveman and Wolfe (1990) shows that the 
well-being of disabled persons (judged by family income) has been 
declining. Further evidence of the problems of individuals with disabil 
ities is provided by the Harris poll, which in 1984 reported that 44 per 
cent of disabled persons who were out of work wanted a job. Title I of 
the ADA tries to raise the employment-to-population ratio in two ways. 
First, it adopts a broad definition of a person with a disability. Second, 
the Act widens the window of prospective jobs by requiring employers 
to provide equal employment opportunities to "a qualified person with
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a disability." The essential functions of the job have to be identified to 
determine if the disabled person is qualified. If an accommodation is 
needed for the worker to perform the essential functions, the employer 
has to provide it unless an undue hardship is imposed. The ADA invites 
litigation, an outcome that I had predicted when the Act was being 
debated, and the caseload at the EEOC has exploded.
Employment prospects have, if anything, deteriorated since the pas 
sage of the ADA. Only 31 percent of disabled individuals held a job 
last year, down from 33 percent in 1986. The share of disabled SSI 
beneficiaries with a job has also dropped, from 6.5 to 5.8 percent 
(Holmes 1994, p. 26). 14 The passage of the ADA was intended to create 
jobs, thereby promoting a movement out of dependency and idleness. 
The burden of supplying work and paying for reasonable accommoda 
tions was legislatively shifted to employers, a policy labeled by 
Burkhauser (1990) as "Morality on the Cheap." We have witnessed a 
sharp increase in the number of lawsuits charging employers with vio 
lations of Title I but no significant rise in employment.
Although the diversity and instability of disabling conditions were 
emphasized in the hearings, the mandate in Title I assumes that gainful 
work is the way to improve well-being for a majority of people with 
disabilities. The presumption implies that the target population exhibits 
a substantial degree of homogeneity in tastes and productive traits, a 
presumption that is not supported by the data. Training for a new job is 
neither practical nor desirable for persons who become disabled at 
older ages, especially when life expectancy is also shortened by the 
onset of the condition. Some may be eligible for benefits under work 
ers' compensation or private disability insurance, but SSA is the 
agency to which most turn for income support. Although monthly DI 
benefits vary depending on the recipient's work history, the dispersion 
is relatively small. Given the high application costs and the SGA limits 
on earnings, a person who applies for DI benefits seems to be making a 
commitment to a more or less permanent withdrawal from the legal 
labor market. A trial work period is available for up to 36 months to 
induce individuals to give up their disability benefits and to return to 
the world of work. The ones already on board are, however, different 
from other disabled individuals. We may be directing the work incen 
tives to the wrong group.
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It is instructive to review the policy of the Department of Veterans 
Affairs. An individual with a service-connected disability is evaluated 
and assigned a rating, which fixes the size of the monthly compensa 
tion. There is no earnings test; everyone who is entitled to a pension 
gets it irrespective of his or her earnings in the labor market. Cohany 
(1987) found that 95.8 percent of Vietnam-era veterans with no disabil 
ities were gainfully employed. The employment rate was 79.9 percent 
for those with a service-connected disability and was closely related to 
the disability rating: 92.2 percent with a disability rating of l-to-30 
percent were working, as compared to 79.5 percent for disability rat 
ings of 30-to-60 percent and 34.5 percent for disability ratings of over 
60 percent. Although the supply of labor will be inversely related to the 
size of the pension, I suspect that the data largely reflect a response to 
the severity of the disabling condition.
The present DI program has the effect of locking in its clients, such 
that very few voluntarily terminate their monthly benefits to return to 
work, and should be replaced by a social insurance program that 
acknowledges the heterogeneity of people with disabilities. The fol 
lowing modifications should be made. First, admission to the program 
should be based on a medical assessment of the applicant's physical 
and mental impairments. The waiting period during which the appli 
cant performs no work should be abandoned. Second, monthly benefits 
should be a function of the applicant's disability class, which could be 
•based on the applicant's age and diagnostic group. 15 Third, the earnings 
test should be abolished, and DI benefits should be subject to income 
taxation. The youngest DI beneficiaries with the lower mortality risks 
receive the smallest monthly benefits; they can supplement their 
monthly disability benefits by working, and the sum of earnings and 
disability benefits should be subject to income taxation. Fourth, each 
beneficiary should be obliged to undergo a disability review to confirm 
that his or her disabling condition still persists and warrants keeping 
him or her on the DI rolls. The time interval before the scheduled dis 
ability review should be shorter for persons with lower disability class 
rankings. A disabled beneficiary in a low disability class is younger 
and stronger. The individual is entitled to a smaller monthly disability 
benefit, which raises the opportunity cost of remaining out of the work 
force. Since there is no earnings test, and benefits will continue until
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the next disability review, the opportunity cost of seeking and obtain 
ing a job is small.
It is unclear if the costs of administering this modified DI program 
will be higher or lower than those of the present system. The placement 
of each client into a disability class and a periodic disability review 
will raise administrative costs, but the proportion requiring appeals is 
likely to be smaller. My proposal has been questioned by the Panel of 
the National Academy of Social Insurance on at least two grounds. 
First, the military relies on a draft to obtain personnel, who are not free 
to choose their assignments. This is simply not true; conscription was 
abolished over 20 years ago. Second, risks are allegedly higher in the 
military, and the recommended changes would lead to inordinately 
high costs or inadequate benefits. These are conjectures that cannot be 
resolved without a careful analysis of the proposal. 16
The current policy portfolio is one in which SSA is mainly responsi 
ble for welfare (supplying income and medical care for seriously dis 
abled individuals), workers' compensation provides support for the 
short-term disabled, and state rehabilitation agencies assist in training 
and job placement. The earnings and dignity from employment are cer 
tainly important. The ADA has adopted a civil rights model, which 
worked well in reducing the height of employment barriers for women 
and racial minorities. The burden of creating jobs and paying for 
accommodations for people with disabilities has been placed on 
employers. When an accommodation is person-specific (and can be 
transported from one employer to another), its cost ought to be 
financed out of general funds rather than placed on an employer.
The ADA has failed to raise the employment-to-population ratio. 
Individuals with disabilities are a diverse group; not all seek work in 
the market. As Jones has pointed out, "Disabilities make certain jobs 
and types of participation impossible." Retirement is a superior option 
for an older individual who experiences the onset of a condition that 
seriously limits performance and shortens longevity. The size and 
availability of disability benefits should be calibrated to the likelihood 
that the individual can be rehabilitated and returned to the world of 
work. One income maintenance policy will not be efficient for a popu 
lation of people with widely different disabling conditions.
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NOTES
1. The working-age adult population in the LaPlante study includes persons up to 69 years old. 
The impairments and chronic conditions identified by LaPlante were combined into 10 groups
2 The concept of health capital is well developed by Grossman (1972) in the context of a life 
cycle model.
3. The data came from the 1972 SSA Survey of Disabled and Nondisabled Adults Separate 
wage equations were estimated for handicapped workers (using the narrow definition from the 
World Health Organization classification) and nonhandicapped workers The validity of this esti 
mate is questionable; a critical review of the methodology is contained in the appendix notes to Oi 
and Andrews (1992)
4 The language of Title I of the Act spells out what is meant by the essential functions of a 
job I have taken the liberty of summarizing the basic clauses, as follows 1. The term pertains to 
the fundamental duties and excludes the marginal functions of the position 2. A job function may 
be considered essential for several reasons it is the reason for the creation of the position, only a 
limited number of employees can perform this function, and/or it is highly specialized 3. The Act 
spells out what constitutes evidence.
5 To paraphrase the EEOC regulations, (1) the term reasonable accommodations means mod 
ification of the job application process, modification of the work environment, or modification 
that allows an employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges; (2) reasonable 
accommodations may include, but are not limited to, equal access, job restructuring including 
part-time or flexible work schedules, reassignment, acquisition of equipment or devices, appropri 
ate examinations and training materials, provision of readers or interpreters; and (3) it may be 
necessary to engage in an interactive process with a qualified person with a disability.
6. Chinkos (1991) has reviewed the studies that revealed modest accommodation costs for the 
comparatively small number of disabled persons who were gainfully employed. These accommo 
dation costs mainly deal with such factors as the acquisition of special equipment, modifying the 
physical layout, or training procedures To the best of my knowledge, no attempt is made to esti 
mate the cost of job restructuring, providing a flexible work schedule, or extra leave for physician 
visits. Chinkos argues that, if the Act is successful in expanding employment, workplace accom 
modation costs could sharply rise as employers hire individuals with more functional limitations 
and impairments The efficiency of placing the cost burden entirely upon employers is questioned 
by Rosen (1991). If the accommodation is reasonable and specific to the particular worker-firm 
attachment, a strong case can be made to share the costs
7 The panel data from the Michigan Survey of Income Dynamics, Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, were screened to obtain samples of married male household heads. Records with data 
for five consecutive years were obtained for 1,760 whites and 771 nonwhites In 1972, 13 1 per 
cent of the whites and 18.3 percent of the nonwhites were disabled However, only 4 9 and 5 8 
percent of these two samples reported a work disability in each of the five years, 1968-1972. 
Details of these tabulations can be found in Oi (1978)
8 All of these persons were judged under the SSA disability determination process to be so 
severely disabled that they were unable to work The DI program imposes a two-year waiting 
period before a beneficiary is entitled to Medicare benefits The objective of the Bye and Riley 
study was to evaluate the merits of eliminating the two-year waiting period
9 The death rate was 6 7 percent for those under 40 years of age but jumped to 13 4 percent 
for the 40-49 age group It continued to climb, but the increment to the oldest age group was only 
1 4 percentage points
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10 The survey covered persons who entered the SSA rolls in 1980-1981 as new beneficiaries 
of the DI, Supplementary Security Income (SSI), or retired worker programs. Follow-up surveys 
were conducted in 1982 and 1991 Some 42 percent of the DI beneficiaries died in the decade fol 
lowing entitlement, the death rate was highest in the first six months on the DI rolls. The kinds of 
data included in the New Beneficiaries Data System (NBDS) are described by Yeas (1992). It is 
my understanding that Howard lams and Barry Bye are preparing an analysis of the DI sample 
from the NBDS in a forthcoming article
11 Lucas and Rapping (1969) showed that the labor supply response to a temporary wage cut 
will be larger than the response to a permanent wage cut because the worker will substitute cur 
rent for future leisure One should expect a similar difference in labor supply responses to dis 
abling conditions that are temporary versus permanent
12. See Oi (1962), Becker (1964), and Ben-Porath (1967)
13. There are three ways to leave the DI rolls: death, attainment of age 65 (and automatically 
transferring to the Old Age and Survivors fund), and recovery (SGA termination). In the Muller 
study, 9.3 percent of those under the age of 40 at entitlement recovered, as compared to only 1.1 
percent of those who were 50-59 years of age in 1981. Notice in table 3 that the percentage sepa 
rated for SGA terminations is only weakly related to family income The surprising result 
reported by Muller is the small dispersion across diagnostic groups in the percentage doing "any 
work," varying from a low of 5.5 percent (respiratory) to a high of 12.8 percent (nervous disor 
ders).
14. Holmes points out that the recession in 1993 may have depressed the employment-to-pop- 
ulation ratio.
15 The Veterans Administration rating scheme assigns a score to each applicant that ranges 
from 0 to 100 percent. Several variables might be consulted to define disability classes for a new 
DI program: quarters of covered work expenence, age, diagnostic group, medical rating of sever 
ity, and education I assume that eligibility will be restricted to persons with X or more quarters of 
covered employment A simple plan might identify only four disability classes: (1) under 50 years 
of age and in diagnostic group DG-A, (2) under 50 and in DG-B, (3) 50 or older and in DG-A, and 
(4) 50 or older and in DG-B. The classification DG-A includes those diagnostic groups exhibiting 
low two-year mortality rates, and DG-B includes diagnostic groups with high mortality rates.
16 An excerpt from a memo prepared for the Panel of the National Academy of Social Insur 
ance noted that there were 2.2 million on the VA disability rolls, of which only 9 percent were 
unable to work Reference to the SSA''s Annual Statistical Supplement, 1993 (p 329) reveals that, 
m 1992, there were 2,181,000 VA pensioners with service-connected disabilities and that 
1,245,000 were under 65 years of age. Only 141,000 VA pensioners were under 65 years of age 
and had ratings of 70 to 100 percent In my proposal, the medical assessment would serve as a 
screen excluding anyone with a rating of under 50 percent This would have excluded an individ 
ual with one eye who would have received a VA disability pension.
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